Ever since the advent of devolution to Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland in the late 1990’s, there has not yet been an answer to the
infamous West Lothian Question, whereby MP’s from those areas cannot vote on
matters that are devolved to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, or
Northern Irish Assembly, but can vote on such issues in the British Parliament
at Westminster – even though their own constituents are not directly affected.
Devolution of certain issues to those legislatures meant that such issues – like
health and education – were no longer issues of a UK-wide concern, and were now
effectively English issues being decided by the UK Parliament at Westminster –
including by Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish MP’s, despite English MP’s
having no such say over devolved matters in Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland.
The West Lothian Question is so named because it was
brought up by Tam Dalyell, the Labour MP for West Lothian during the
parliamentary debates on devolution in the 1970’s. It was he who asked how such
a then-hypothetical situation could be sustained, and as such, he was a prominent
opponent of devolution because nobody could provide him with an answer to his
question.
Now with devolution entering a stage in which substantial
legislative and fiscal powers are set to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament
(in fulfillment of the Vow made towards the end of the independence referendum
campaign), there is an increasing need to answer Dalyell’s 40 year old
question.
Labour attempted to answer it by proposing regional devolution within England following the devolution it had established in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Tony Blair's government succeeded in a referendum to devolve power to Greater London, which involved the creation of the directly elected Mayor of London. However, the attempt to create a devolved assembly in North East England was so heavily defeated by the electorate of that region in a 2004 referendum, that the idea was shelved for all the other regions (bar London), and the government effectively kicked an answer to the WLQ into the long grass.
The answer that is now set to be pursued by the current
Conservative government of Prime Minister David Cameron appears to be English Votes for
English Laws (EVEL). This has been Conservative Party policy since devolution
came about, and it has different variants, but the gist of it is that the
Speaker of the House of Commons will determine which bills going through the
Commons are applicable only to England (or England and Wales), and therefore
require a majority of only English (or English and Welsh) MP’s to pass such
legislation. Some variants of EVEL call for an absolute “veto” in which
relevant MP’s will have the ultimate say over such legislation, regardless of
how other MP’s may vote. Others merely allow for those MP’s alone to vote at
the committee stage (where amendments can be made), whilst allowing the full
Commons to vote on the legislation at its final stage.
Either way, EVEL will likely mean some dilution in the voice
of Scottish MP’s in the British Parliament because it is simply becoming more
difficult to justify their votes on issues that do not affect their
constituents – issues which have essentially become English issues because of
devolution.
What’s ironic is that the Scottish National Party (SNP)
campaigned heavily at the last election on a platform of “making Scotland’s
voice heard” and “giving a louder voice for Scotland” at Westminster – as if to
say that Scotland never had a voice there, which is plainly ludicrous, as
Scotland as been sending MP’s to Parliament since the Union began in 1707.
(Here, they engage in the art form of conflating Scotland with the SNP.)
However, as an acquaintance of mine in Scotland – a
gentleman named Graeme – has said, devolution has “turned the hypothetical ‘West
Lothian Question’ into reality, creating a situation in which Scottish MPs were
voting on English affairs that English MPs no longer had any say over in
Scotland.” Furthermore, he adds that as devolution was being implemented during
the last Labour government (1997-2010), the UK had a Scot – Gordon Brown –
“representing a Scottish constituency [and] serving as Chancellor and then
Prime Minister formulating policies on health, education, policing, etc in
England that were no longer within the remit of the UK Government within
Scotland.”
Now with the recent extraordinary success of the SNP in
winning 56 of 59 Scottish seats in the Commons and the prospect of further
devolution (including the full devolution of setting income tax) to Holyrood,
the constitutional anomaly of the WLQ has become “unsustainable” and EVEL “has
more or less” become inevitable.
However, Joyce McMillan in The Scotsman disagrees with such
notions, and claims that for decades, Scotland has had to put up with “England’s
political preferences.” But this attempt to say that “karma’s a b****” with
regard to Scottish influence across the UK ignores the changes wrought by
devolution. It also ignores the idea that British general elections ought to be
about what the voters across the UK want, as opposed to attempting to break the
votes down by certain areas. However, even when you do this, what you find is
that since World War II, Scotland has gotten the government it wants more often than
not, and indeed on two occasions – in 1964 and 1974 – Scotland voted for and
got a Labour government, even though England voted Tory. In a democracy,
sometimes you win, and sometimes you lose.
Nevertheless, devolution was brought about to address a
“democratic deficit” with regard to Scotland’s place within the Union, and to
lessen “English influence” on “Scottish affairs.” With this, logic follows that
some people in England may wish to lessen “Scottish influence” on “English
affairs.”
McMillan says this ignores the “brute fact” that the UK is
an asymmetrical union in which 85% of the population resides in one part of the
country – England, and that EVEL will shut Scotland out of critical decisions
that affect the UK as a whole – including Scotland.
Unionists such as Graeme are then oft to point out that this
is an admission that devolution – at the very least – is a flawed concept whose
architects failed to think through its implications on Scotland and the United
Kingdom as a whole, and its implementation in a piecemeal manner failed to engage the UK as a whole on constitutional matters.
They also contend that the asymmetry to which McMillan
refers did not exist before devolution, for with a single sovereign parliament
in London, all of the British people were represented by MP’s who could equally
participate in the parliamentary process in full without question. This allowed
for many Scots to take their rightful place in powerful and prominent positions
in government – defense secretaries, home secretaries, foreign secretaries,
chancellors of the Exchequer, and prime ministers – and representing the
interests of the UK as a whole (including Scotland).
Only after the high-charged and emotive rhetoric of “Tory
government’s we didn’t vote for” and “English laws imposed on Scotland” (especially
following the eleven years of Margaret Thatcher’s government – 1979-1990 – during which
Scotland repeatedly voted Labour, though the UK as a whole voted Conservative) followed
by devolution in 1999 did the fundamental nature of Scottish parliamentary representation
come under question – first with the cutting of Scotland’s MP’s from 72 to 59,
and now the proposals for EVEL.
McMillan claims that this is “largely designed to massage
the wounded pride of English Tory MPs by offering them a bump up the
pecking-order in the public-school politics of Westminster.” However, with the
West Lothian Question becoming a reality (as Tam Dalyell had warned), English MP’s – whatever their
political stripe – have a legitimate constitutional issue. By attempting to
solve one democratic deficit, another one was created in the process.
This is not to say that EVEL is the optimal response, but
after the clamor for “more powers” for the Scottish Parliament (including the
prospect of Full Fiscal Autonomy (FFA), where all taxes raised in Scotland would go
to Holyrood) should anyone be surprised?
But realistically, given the geographic reality, England
will never truly be free of Scottish influence, and Scotland will certainly
never be free of English influence.
Using veteran nationalist Paul Henderson Scott’s description
of Scotland’s relationship with England as that of being in bed with an
elephant – and the need to be free of the elephant, Kenny Farquharson wrote recently in The Times that this failed to “acknowledge basic
geography and economics.” Without the United Kingdom holding them together,
Scotland and England may well move to separate beds, but will still have to
share the same room – the same island, Great Britain. Being ten times the size
of Scotland, Farquharson notes that “England will always be our bigger, more
populous, more powerful neighbor” and what it does “politically, economically,
culturally — will always have a profound effect on us [in Scotland].”
In other words – despite what some
nationalists may want to believe – Scotland cannot ignore its big sister, the
elephant. Farquharson goes on to mention that Scotland’s exports within the UK
– to England, Northern Ireland, and Wales – amounted to £44.9 billion, which is
a considerable sum when one considers that Scottish exports to the rest of the
world combined was £22 billion (and less than half of this was with the
European Union).
Indeed, one of the flaws of
EVEL is how to know what issues can be classified as “English only” or “English
and Welsh only”, for even though a piece of paper may say that, members from
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland can also argue that because of England’s
size, legislation that legally applies only to England can (and will) have affects –
particularly financial – on the rest of the UK.
This is why EVEL is quite controversial, for it would create
two classes of MP’s – English MP’s with full time access to the Commons and all
stages of the parliamentary process in the Commons, and non-English MP’s who
would effectively be told to stay out of their own parliament on certain days,
even though the legislation and issues debated on those days may indirectly
affect their constituents.
It is also why even though Yes Scotland and
the SNP were campaigning on the idea of Scotland being master of its destiny,
they were also trying to argue for a form of independence that would retain
links with the rest of the UK, but leave it without the ability to shape it, as
the continuing Union would continue to substantially influence Scotland –
regardless of the constitutional arrangements.
This points to the importance of
maintaining the United Kingdom as something that is in Scotland’s best
interests, and maintaining as firm a Union as possible with full and complete
parliamentary representation in Parliament for everybody, rather than trying to
unravel it and creating more grievances along the way.
Indeed, one of the reasons for the merger of England and
Scotland into the UK was to give Scotland access to the much larger English
markets, and this – along with the much wider British Empire – proved to be
highly beneficial to Scotland. But even without the Empire, being part of the
United Kingdom, as Farquharson points out, has been beneficial to Scotland’s
economic prospects more than anything else, and UK as a whole has benefited from
Scottish contributions (in terms of human, social, financial, natural, and instructional capital) that have helped to make it a global leader and significant world
power, which in turn provides benefits to the UK – including Scotland.
Attempting to loosen the UK with well-meaning, but ill
thought out devolution and EVEL threatens to upset these necessary bonds –
political, economic, and social – which keep Britain together. Indeed, one of
the disheartening prospects is that there may never again be a Chancellor of
the Exchequer or Prime Minister from Scotland representing a Scottish
constituency.
On this point, my friend Graeme believes that:
“Nationalism and devolution has not increased Scotland's
power and influence within the Union, it has significantly diminished it. It
has rendered much of Scotland's influence within the wider UK intolerable to
that part of the UK which forms the majority of its population, and has made it
very difficult for it to be [constitutionally] acceptable for any Scottish MP
to occupy any cabinet post other than that of Foreign or Defence Secratary,
because any other cabinet position would make them responsible for policies in
England over which the English have no say over in Scotland, which the English
no longer consider to be either fair or acceptable.”
He further laments that thanks to “poorly handled devolution
and [acquiescence] to nationalist demands” Scotland and Scots, “once a powerful
and disproportionately influential voice within the Union, have rendered
themselves in some respects as bystanders to larger issues within the United
Kingdom” – many of which will continue to affect Scotland.
The result, he
fears, will be that “England and the English will come to dominate the UK far
more than they have ever done” and that this was perhaps the way the
nationalists had planned it, for it certainly would give them “even more
grievance fuel to further their agenda”, and that some Scots “will believe them when they say that
England is unfairly denying Scotland a voice within the UK by freezing them out
of influence at Westminster.” It would make the roar of the Scottish lion
“sound more like a cat’s mewling.”
McMillan attempts to get around this by saying that it would
be rather pompous for English Tories to talk about “speaking for England”, as
if England is a homogenous community when in fact it is not – pointing out that
“the England of the 21st century is a vastly diverse nation, which contains
millions of people – from Liverpool to Portsmouth, from Truro to South Shields
– who are fully as exasperated with the current Westminster establishment, and
its failed politics of austerity, as any Scottish voter.” Her solution is to
use the House of Lords as a chamber that represents the nations of the UK, as
well as the regions within England, which in her view, would meet the
“standards of 21st-century democracy.”
As it is, I have written on how the Lords can be reformed in such a way. Looking back, this probably should have been the way to go in addressing the asymmetries that she refers to, which have also been noted by many pro-Union
politicians such as Gordon Brown. If this had been achieved long ago, it may
have averted the need for devolution, because it would have guaranteed a level
of Scottish representation in the upper house that would have been on par – or
nearly on par – with England, so that Scotland’s voice (or rather voices, since
Scotland is just as diverse as England) could be heard and provide wisdom and
scrutiny to government legislation. Even if a reformed Lords did not have the
absolute ability to block government legislation, it could – with substantial
Scots influence – force the government to think again on its agenda.
Indeed, perhaps another flaw in devolution was that it made changes along the edges of the British constitution without also making changes at the center, and this has left the country with an unbalanced governmental structure that is prone to misunderstandings and grievance-mongering.
Of course, there would still be people making the case for devolution
and decentralization from London. In fact, the idea of revamping the United
Kingdom into a federal union like the United States has taken hold in some
quarters in the wake of the referendum. But even Gordon Brown has remarked that
federalism can only go but so far in a country where 85% of the population
lives in one area, and most forms of federalism still mean having a strong
central government with the ability to levy and collect taxes, and make an
array of laws that directly apply to all people throughout the entire union.
In essence, federalism means that there are some powers exclusively exercised by the federal government, some powers exclusively exercised by the federated governments, and some powers are exercised jointly. For example, in the US and Germany, the setting of income and corporate taxes are a joint responsibility of federal and state governments. The federal governments and legislatures in both countries are quite powerful –
though their power is limited in certain areas.
Indeed, the authority of the British Parliament at
Westminster has already been limited in practice, regardless of the fact that
it possesses ultimate sovereignty across the UK. The Scottish Parliament, Welsh
Assembly, and Northern Irish Assembly are now semi-permanent institutions to
the point where no prime minister or his/her government will dare contemplate
abolishing them.
The issue at hand now is how these institutions, the British
Parliament, and potential institutions in England can fit into a federal
framework for the United Kingdom as a whole. This will require an end to ad hoc
devolution (including the proposal for Full Fiscal Autonomy for Holyrood) as
well as the crude answers contained in the proposals for EVEL. Joyce McMillan
herself acknowledged that the decision to devolve control of setting income tax
rates was “strange and hasty”, for the income tax allows for one of the most
transparent forms of redistribution from wealthier parts of a country to
another, and the concept of pooling and sharing resources throughout the United
Kingdom for the benefit of all was one of the main arguments used for keeping
Scotland as part of the Union.
If the Union is to
survive at this point, there needs to be the establishment of a UK
constitutional convention that will attempt to sort out the issues of British
governance and forge a lasting constitutional settlement that is as “fair” as
possible to everybody. It means looking at the United Kingdom as a whole and having a firm understanding of how it ought to work going forward, which – among other things – means defining the powers of a federal UK Parliament (as Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution does for the US Congress), the limits on the federal parliament (Article 1, Section 9), and the powers and limitations on the federated governments of the nations and regions within the UK (Article 1, Section 10).
It also means defining the values that bring Britain together as a country, and establishing principles upon which the people and their representatives can build on.
This effort will require an enormous amount of good faith, tact,
skill, statesmanship (likely in the face of political party interest), creative
imagination, and a sense of vision and purpose to make such a settlement a
success. It will also require the participation of people from all walks of life in Britain – including ordinary citizens, civic organizations, and faith groups in an expression of British civic participation that may also facilitate bringing people together and forging a sense of a common identity and common ideals for Britain going forward.
The
brute reality is that Scotland and England have been “interfering” in each
others affairs for centuries, and they really can't help it, given the island they share. The Union simply made it official, and in my opinion, it is in everyone’s interest for Britain to remain together, for Britain has so much collective potential, and its people can achieve much more together – not just for themselves, but for the world at large – than they could ever do apart.
